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STATEMENT OF FACTS-
1) In their Brief, Appellees admitted they did not address all of the 
arguments in Appellants' Opening Brief. [Appellees' Brf., @ page 2] 
Appellees did not address the following arguments: 
A) Marshaling the Evidence - The trial court's failure to marshal 
sufficient evidence so that a reviewing court could conduct a meaningful 
review. [Appellants' Brief, @ pages 1 & 2] Since Appellees do not contest 
Appellants' argument that the Ruling and Order is insufficient in providing 
this reviewing Court enough information for a meaningful review, the Court 
should view Appellees' silence as their being in agreement that the Record is 
deficient. 
The Appellants' other arguments addressed to the trial court's errors in: 
B) using findings and conclusions from a different lawsuit with different 
plaintiffs against Appellants. [Appellants' Brief, @ pages 2, 3 & 4] 
C) making unsupported "conclusions" against Appellants. 
[Appellants' Brief, @ pages 4 thru 12] 
D) not finding the earlier Puttuck 1 settlement a "favorable termination." 
[Appellants' Brief, @ pages 22 thru 27] 
Appellants assert that in not opposing those arguments this Court should 
find that: 
• Appellees have no evidence or arguments to defeat said arguments, 
• The Appellants' arguments on these issues stand before the court, 
uncontested, and, 
Accordingly, Appellants should prevail on these issues. 
RECORD CORRECTION-
Appellees assert that: 
Puttuck's wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of 
process claims are based entirely on his assertion that the 
Gendrons wrongfully filed and pursued counterclaims 
against him in Puttuck 1. ... There are no other allegations 
of wrongdoing, [Appellees' Brf., @ page 4] 
This is error. Appellants claimed Defendant Peter Gendron lied under oath 
to support the counterclaims. 
Record - Complaint, @ paras 30, 31, 37, 38, 42 & 47. 
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ARGUMENTS-
W R O N G F U L U S E C I V I L P R O C E E D I N G S 
and A B U S E OF P R O C E S S -
Appellees state: 
... Any assertion that the fictional counterclaims were without 
merit would have been required to have been asserted in that 
case and would have been extinguished by the settlement and 
dismissal with prejudice of Puttuck 1. 
[Appellees' Brf., @ page 4] 
The facts substantiate that Puttuck 1 had been concluded before Appellants 
discovered the falsity of the counterclaims. They had no reason to believe 
that the counterclaims were false and that Defendant Peter Gendron perjured 
himself at his 02/23/00 deposition until he testified in the Hale deposition in 
November '03. By then Puttuck 1 was closed. 
Record, Complaint, @ paras 30, 35-38, 42, 47, Opposition, pages 3-4, 8, 
&10. 
The California Civil Code has a section entitled: Maxims of Jurisprudence. 
One such maxim says: 
The law never requires impossibilities. 
CA. Civil C.,@ 3531 
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It was impossible for Appellants to have asserted their abuse of process and 
perjury claims against Defendants until the evidence, the perjured testimony 
to support these claims existed. It first existed after Puttuck 1 was closed so 
it could not have been asserted in Puttuck 1. 
Utah has a contract statute, U.C.A., 78-11-8 directly on point: 
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same contract 
or transaction when ever, after a former action, a new cause 
of action arises therefrom. 
This law is not equivocal. It specifically provides for "a new cause of action 
after a former action rising under the same contract. " This is exactly what 
is present here. 
E A R L I E R R E L E A S E -
In reviewing the "Stipulated Motion and Order for Dismissal" under Puttuck 
1, there is no mention in that stipulation barring any new claims that could 
arise in the future. Record -Appellees' Addendum, pages 34-36. This 
stipulation precludes Appellees' argument that if the counter counterclaims 
were without merit those claims "would have been required to have been 
asserted in that case and would have been extinguished by the settlement 
and dismissal with prejudice of Puttuck 1. " 
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F A C T D E T E R M I N A T I O N S-
If there is a question of when Appellants "discovered or should have 
discovered" the falsity of the counterclaims and Defendant Gendron's 
perjured testimony, that "question" is a factual questions and properly must 
await a jury's determination. 
C I V I L C O N S P I R A C Y & 
O B S T R U C T I O N OF J U S T I C E -
In citing Cline II, Appellees state: 
When a statute makes certain acts unlawful and provides 
criminal penalties for such acts, but does not specifically 
provide for a private cause of action, we generally will 
not create such a private right of action. 
The Utah code provides criminal penalties for .... 
obstruction of justice and perjury but does not provide 
for a private right of action for any of those acts. 
[Appellees' Brf., @ 5] 
Appellants assert that this rule of construction is error because: 
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A- when enacting our criminal laws, our legislature is not necessarily 
simultaneously focusing on "specifically" providing civil 
remedies under criminal codes. This is especially true when there 
are several other codes for legislating various civil remedies. 
Moreover, 
B- Few, if any, of our criminal statutes specifically provide for 
civil remedies. For example, DUI is a crime and when a 
DUI driver causes injury he/she is subject to civil liability. 
The DUI statute however, does not provide any specific 
civil remedy for such civil lawsuits. 
[See U.C.A. 41-6a-502, et. seq.] 
Likewise, our assault statutes do not specifically provide for a 
civil remedy but civil assault and battery actions have proceeded 
through our court system forever. 
[See, U.C.A., 76-5-101, et seq.] 
Appellants are aware of U.C.A., 31A-26-301 as a statute directly 
addressing a private cause of action. At subsection 5, it says: This 
section does not create a private cause of action. Likewise, U.C.A. 
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13-25(a)-107 specifically provides for a private cause of action under 
the Telephone & Facsimile Solicitation Act. 
Appellants assert that to, "infer that by their silence about a civil 
remedy in a criminal statute that the legislature's intentions were not 
to provide a civil remedy" directly contradicts the plain meaning of 
31A-26-301 wherein the legislature saw fit to actually say there is no 
private cause of action and 13-25(a)-107 where it directly created one. 
These statutes prove that when the legislature wants to preclude or 
include a private cause of action, it specifically does so by clear 
language. 
C- if the legislature is silent on a criminal statute in addressing 
a civil remedy, Appellants believe that the silence properly 
should be interpreted as providing for a civil remedy. That 
is, it should be only when a criminal statute specifically denies a civil 
remedy should the courts find no civil remedy. 
Appellants believes this because: 
1- In such statutes, it will be abundantly clear that the legislature 
had civil remedies on their mind when enacting the criminal statute. 
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2- Many criminal statutes do not specifically address a civil 
remedy and yet, historically, in practice there are attendant civil 
causes of action. 
3- The idea of finding that something not specified in a criminal 
statute is nevertheless present therein notwithstanding its absence, 
[here a civil cause of action], contradicts many a case law finding. 
The holdings in Harmon City v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 
1168, [Utah, 1995] and in Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 [Utah, 
1995] strongly suggest the opposite. 
That is, if, on occasion, the legislature saw fit to address a civil cause 
of action either by denying it or approving it in a criminal statute this 
shows that in that instance the legislature had the civil question on its 
collective mind and addressed it. This is in difference to inferring 
from a criminal statute that is totally silent of any mention of a civil 
question means that there is no civil cause of action. 
Harmon City and Neel said: 
Each term in a statute was used advisedly. 
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While it is understandable that our legislature intentionally chose each 
term and provision of a statute, it simply does not follow that the 
absence of a provision was intentional and specifically means 
something not said. A basic tenant of criminal jurisprudence is that 
the defendant's silence must not be, cannot be, construed against 
him/her. That same principle should be followed here. Silence 
should not be construed as an assertion. 
At page 1170, Harmon City said: 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect 
to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve [citation omitted] To discover that 
intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute, we 
assume that i(each term of the statute was used advisedly; thus 
the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable, [citation omitted] Only 
when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain meaning need 
we seek guidance from legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations. 
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Under Harmon City, the court's approach to interpreting a statute is 
clear. The operative factors are: 
a- what is the intent of the statute? 
In a criminal statute, the intent is to address criminal 
wrongdoings and to provide criminal penalties. There is no 
intent in a criminal statute to address civil law. 
b- looking at the plain language. 
To look at the plain language is to look at what the statute 
actually says - not to look at what is not mentioned. 
o read the words literally. 
"Read the words literally" means read the words. If there are 
no words there is nothing to read. The court should not read 
into what is not said. 
d- if the statute is ambiguous, seek guidance in its legislative 
history. 
A statute that makes no mention of any civil issues in not 
ambiguous. Without any ambiguity, the court has no need to 
even go to its legislative history. In Cline II, the court is going 
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well beyond the statute's legislative history and into making 
unwarranted "assumptions." 
To assume that in a criminal statute, the absence of any mention of a 
civil cause of action or remedy means that there is no such civil 
remedy violates the foundation rules of all statutory construction. 
When our legislature advisedly chooses certain terms in a law, it is 
imagination to assign meaning to an issue not addressed in any way in 
the statute. 
And because: 
4- Another Maxim of Jurisprudence says: 
For every wrong there is a remedy. 
CA. Civil C. @ 3523 
To interpret our statutes in this light would be in keeping with the 
"open courts" provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 
11, which mandates that injured person shall have a remedy ... and 
shall not be barred from prosecuting any civil cause of action. Said 
provisions are also in keeping with the U.S. Constitution's "open 
courts" provisions. 
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This constitutional provision clearly mandates that if a person is 
injured they shall have remedy through a civil cause of action. 
"Shall" is a mandatory term. A criminal statute does not provide an 
injured person a "civil cause of action." A criminal statute gives the 
State and her citizens a remedy but that is not a remedy for he who is 
injured. 
It is true that statutes can be enacted that abrogate certain causes of action or 
remedies. This direct abrogation of a cause of action or remedy however, is 
not with restrictions. That is, if a statute affirmatively abrogates a cause of 
action or remedy it violates the "open courts" provision unless the statute or 
other law: 
1- provides an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy by due course of law; and, 
2- if there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, 
the abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil 
to be eliminated and elimination of existing legal remedy 
is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
the objective. 
Hirpa v. IHC, 948 P.2d 785 [Utah, 1197] 
Woods v. U. of U. Med, Cntr., 67 P.3d 436 [Utah, 2002] 
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Appellants argue that when a statute directly abrogates a cause of 
action or remedy it must satisfy the certain rigid guidelines of Hirpa 
and Woods. Yet, instantly, we find the law and the courts circum-
venting these constitutional mandates when the court infers that a 
criminal statute completely silent on a civil cause of action or remedy 
means the legislature intentionally abrogated the civil causes of action 
or remedies through that silence. This is patently wrong. Such an 
inference violates the Constitution at Article 1, Section 11. 
To assume a criminal statute provides no civil remedy leaves an 
injured party without an effective and reasonable alternative remedy. 
Likewise, such an assumption has no justification in eliminating any 
clear social or economic evil Clearly, such an assumption is both 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The practice of assuming there is no civil cause of action or remedy in 
a silent criminal statute blatantly abuses the criteria of Hirpa and 
Woods and the rights of the State's citizens. 
Finally, to fail to provide a civil remedy is to indirectly provide an 
unlegislated immunity for wrongdoers. To fail to provide a remedy, 
to provide immunity is to aid and abet wrongdoers. 
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C I V I L C O N S P I R A C Y -
Appellees argue: 
There is no assertion William knew Peter's testimony to be false 
or that the two of them planned for Peter to testify falsely. There-
fore Puttuck failed to plead an essential element of civil conspiracy5 
Appellees' Brf., @ 6 
This is manifest error. To quote Plaintiffs/Appellants' Complaint: 
30) Defendant PETER, while under oath, testified falsely about said 
counter-claims At this time Defendant WILLIAM knew Defendant 
PETER was testifying falsely. 
31) Defendant WILLIAM had ample opportunities to discredit or disavow 
Defendant PETER5s false testimony but he failed and refused to do so. Due 
to his silence Plaintiffs assert he ratified and acquiesced in the false 
testimony and approved of Defendant PETER's false testimony. 
37) .... Accordingly, Plaintiffs assert Defendant WILLIAM knowingly 
adopted and ratified the false testimony and 
14 
38) .... Defendant PETER testified falsely and Defendant WILLIAM 
approved of said false testimony to hinder the prosecution of Plaintiffs' 
claims and to intimidate Plaintiffs. 
42) .... Defendant WILLIAM approved of the false testimony,.... 
Given Defendant WILLIAM'S failure and refusal to disavow the false 
testimony full well always knowing said testimony was false, his conduct 
manifested his knowing approval and ratification of the false testimony. 
47) Plaintiffs believe Defendants conspired between themselves: 
1- to wrongfully use the civil processes, 2- to commit perjury, 3- to 
obstruct justice, and, 4- to abuse the civil processes. 
Record - Complaint, @ pages 6 to 10. 
Clearly, Appellants have alleged Defendants William and Peter Gendron 
knowingly conspired to obstruct justice, to wrongfully use and abuse the 
civil processes by filing false counter claims and then having Peter lie in his 
deposition about the counter-claims. 
* * * * * * * 
[Note: Appellees' reliance on the Waddoups case is in error as that was a 
summary judgment motion where the standard of proof was different 
because discovery had commenced. [Appellees' Brf., @ page 6,]] 
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AMENDING COMPLAIN T-
Appellees assert that because Appellants did not formally move the trial 
court with a memorandum of points and authorities, the trial court was 
justified in denying the "motion" to amend. Appellees' Brf, @ pages 8-9 
Appellants voice the follow objections to that conclusion. 
1- Before the trial court rules on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has no 
way of knowing if any amendment will be necessary nor exactly what the 
court will find deficient in the complaint. A plaintiff cannot amend without 
knowing what needs to be amended. And what needed to be amended 
was not discovered until after the trial court issued its Ruling and Order. 
Again, the law never requires impossibilities. And to make a motion to 
amend before a court rules on the sufficiency of the complaint under a 
motion to dismiss is to ask for the impossible, e.g., to predict the future 
through formal points and authorities. 
2- Appellants "motion to amend" made in concluding his "Memo of 
Points and Authorities in their Opposition to Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss, was not really a "motion" to amend but rather a request for permis-
sion to file a motion to amend after Appellants became aware of just what 
the trial court found [might find] deficient. Record, Opposition, page 13. 
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3- Appellees cite case law for the holding that a formal motion to amend 
together with formal points and authorities are necessary to: 
a- mitigate the prejudice to the adverse party by allowing that party 
to respond to the motion; 
b- assure that the court is appraised of the basis for the motion and 
rule upon it with a proper understanding of the motion; and to, 
c- permit the court to ascertain what changes are sought and whether 
justice so requires the amendment of the pleading. 
Appellees' Brf., @ page 8-9 
Instantly, through the motion to dismiss, all these conditions were met 
through the Defendants' moving and reply statement of facts and 
memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiffs' written Opposition and 
the parties' oral arguments. That is: 
a- Clearly, Appellees offense in bringing their motion to dismiss they 
argued what they though to be all of the deficiencies in the Complaint. 
Thus, with moving, opposing and reply papers there is no prejudice 
because both parties are having a full opportunity "to respond. " 
b- by the parties moving and opposing papers and oral arguments, the 
Court "was appraised of the basis for the motion ", and the Court's 
Ruling and Order shows the Court had a "proper understanding of the 
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motion " for the Court's findings "created" the issues that needed 
amending. 
c- Through the Court's Ruling and Order, it was aware of exactly what 
changes would be sought. Obviously, the changes would be those the 
Court found insufficient. And, 
d- The Court found the "motion to amend" not warranted because its 
Ruling and Order reflected it believed Plaintiffs could not state any 
valid causes of action, so justice did not require an amendment to the 
pleading. Record - Ruling & Order, @ 90 & 95 
Appellants believe that where the reason is the same the rule should be the 
same. That is, in this instance all of the reasoning underlying a formal 
motion to amend was met through the motion to dismiss. 
4- The trial court did not deny Appellants' motion/request for permission 
to amend based upon the lack of a formal motion and written points and 
authorities. It denied permission to amend because it said under no 
circumstances could Plaintiffs plead a valid cause[s] of action. Appellants 
could not properly plead their claim,,, these claims ... are without merit and 
must be dismissed. Record - Order, @ pages 15-18 But under the 
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governing law, the Record need to show to a certainty that under no set of 
facts could Plaintiffs prevail. 
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was reversed because the 
record did not persuade the appeals court that there was no set of 
facts under which defendant might succeed. Olson v. Park-Craig-
Olson, 815 P.2d 1356, 1362 [10] [Ut. Ct. App., 1991] 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) will be affirmed only 
if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claims. Heiner v. S. J, Groves & Sons, 790 P.2d 107, 110 [Ut. Ct. 
App., 1990]; Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 [Utah, 1991] 
The Record is so deficient it cannot be said to a certainty the there are no set 
of facts Plaintiffs could prove that would state a valid cause of action. For 
example: 
Appellees assert Plaintiff cannot prevail on their "wrongful use of a civil 
proceeding and abuse of process claims " because the Complaint did not 
name the Defendants' company, LRG as a defendant itself Appellees' Brf., 
19 
page 3. But, given permission to amend and naming LRG as a defendant 
cures this deficiency. Would that not be in the interests of justice? 
Notwithstanding the above argument, if the defendants were the real party in 
interest behind the false counterclaims and committed/permitted perjury to 
support them, then as principals, officers and directors who ratified the false 
counterclaim via the perjury, they would be liable. 
S T A T U T E OF L I M I T A T I O N S -
Appellees assert that: 
Puttuck failed to plead any facts establishing the 
discovery Rule applied to toll the statute of limitations. 
Appellees' Brf., page 8 
This is another error. In addressing the question of''establishing facts to toll 
the statute of limitation" the Record says: 
a- tolling applies if: 
• the defendant misled or concealed the claimant. 
Appellants have alleged Defendant Peter Gendron committed 
perjury at his deposition. Surely, lying under oath is to 
"mislead or conceal." 
Sew v. Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 629, 637 [13]; citing 
Warren v. Provo, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 [Utah, 1992] 
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Additionally, under the Statement of Facts, Plaintiff Complaint says: 
During the earlier, Puttuck v. Gendron lawsuit [filed 02/24/99] and before 
the Hale -v- Gendron lawsuit, Defendants asserted a $500,000 counter claim 
against Puttuck. At this time, Peter Gendron testified the $500,000 counter-
claim was due Plaintiff Puttuck's mismanagement. He testified he put the 
counter-claims together. This case finally settled in Puttuck's favor. 
Record, Complaint, @ paras 8-13 
Almost 4 years after Puttuck sued the Gendrons, Hale sued the Gendons 
[12/27/02]. Defendants asserted a $500,000 counter claim against Hale. At 
this time, in Nov. '03 deposition, Peter Gendron testified the $500,000 
counterclaim was due Plaintiff Hale's mismanagement. He testified he put 
the counter-claims together. The time frame when the defendants incurred 
the Hale mismanagement costs substantially overlapped the time defendants 
counter-claims accused Puttuck of mismanagement. 
Record, Complaint, @ paras 14-19 
Peter Gendron5s second deposition in November of 03, was the first time 
Appellants could have discovered the falsity about the earlier counterclaims 
against them. Prior to that, Appellants could have/may have believed the 
claims to be a mistake but had no inkling they were perjury based until 
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November '03. Even in '03, Appellants knew only that there was 
significantly different under-oath testimony concerning the same 
counterclaims. But when Peter Gendron testified at the Hale trial in 
conformity with his '03 deposition testimony, then it was clear he had 
perjured himself years earlier in the Puttuck deposition. 
Record, Opposition, @ 11, Transcript @ 12 
Understandably, one cannot allege perjury until on notice of the perjury. 
That first notice occurred in November, '03. Appellants filed the instant 
Complaint on 03/12/07, clearly within the 4 years of the "happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 
CONCLUSION-
Appellants believe that this Court must reverse the trial court's Ruling and 
Order because: 
1- All the causes of action plead first arose after Puttuck 1 was 
concluded. Successive causes of action are permitted by law. 
At dismissal of Puttuck 1, there was no surrender of future 
causes of action that might arise. 
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2- Questions t)f when a cause of action was discovered or should have 
been discovered is a factual determination warranting a jury 
determination. 
3- The Utah Constitution requires injured persons be afforded a civil 
remedy for the wrong/injury they suffer at the hand's of wrongdoers. 
4- Appellants have pled sufficient facts to put the defendants on notice of 
the claims being asserted against them. 
5- The interests of justice required Appellants be afforded an opportunity 
to amend their Complaint. 
6- The Record is void sufficient information for the trial court to have 
found that there are no facts under which Appellants could plead to 
make a valid cause[s] of action. And, 
7- Without knowing the thought or reasoning processes of the trial court, 
this Court cannot do a meaningful review of the Record. 
Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, this Court must reverse the trial 
court's Ruling and Order. 
Date: 17, March 2008 \ RfeMctfully submitted; 
jcilifc, FAY 
**Argues-Rply \ W 
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PROOF OF SERVICE -
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed via first-class U.S. mail, a true and 
correct copy of the APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF on this the I") day 
of March, 2008 to the following: 
HEATHER WHITE 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(DEE WEN ADAMS 
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